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Soldiers for hire are not a new phenomenon of the twenty-first century; they are 
as old as war itself.  However, in the present day these modern day soldiers for hire are 
part of well-organized and competently run Private Military Companies (PMC).  These 
companies have proven themselves to be both highly effective and economically 
efficient.  The purpose of this thesis is to identify any functions the Government could 
outsource to PMC’s.  This thesis finds that the best types of operation in which to use 
PMC’s are in support of security operations, in small-scale conflicts, and in situations 
where human rights violations are occurring, yet the rest of the world decides not to 
intervene.  This outsourcing would allow the government to realize cost savings and 
allow the military to focus on what it does best, its core competencies.  Additionally, this 
thesis outlines potential problems that arise with privatizing warfare and offers proposals 
to overcome those shortfalls.  Finally, this thesis finds that the best way to structure a 
contract between the United States Government and a PMC is to have built-in incentives 
to ensure that a PMC not only completes the mission quickly, but also controls costs to 
the maximum extent possible.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Mercenaries were used by nearly every empire from ancient Egypt to the colonial 
British Empire.  Greece, Rome, Byzantium, and the Holy Roman Empire all employed 
mercenaries as part of their fighting forces; even the United States resorted to their use in 
a few instances.1  The mercenary’s expertise in the art of war has made him valuable 
throughout history.  Today, the mercenary soldier of old has been transformed into the 
twenty-first century Private Military Company (PMC); a PMC operates in a similar 
manner to any modern-day business; the only difference is the good it offers its customer-
− war.  This thesis explores whether the U.S. could once again benefit from the use of 
soldiers for hire.      
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this MBA thesis is to identify a possible outsource option that the 
Government has not yet exploited: the outsourcing of war to Private Military Companies.  
This paper gives a brief history of the use of mercenaries, documents recent examples of 
PMC use, gives a brief overview of ethical considerations and limitations one must 
consider, and gives recommendations for how the United States could effectively 
incorporate PMC use into its foreign policy.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This thesis focuses on two areas.  First, it asks the question:
How might Private Military Companies be used to conduct similar missions 
to those conducted by a state run military in a more cost-effective manner?  
Once the above question is answered, this thesis considers the ethics involved 
with the use of private military actors and attempts to answer the question:
How might the United States employ Private Military Companies as part of its 
foreign policy and realize the cost savings that such use allows?
1A few examples are during the Revolutionary War and the Vietnam War.  Both these examples and 
more will be fully discussed in the following chapter.
2D. METHODOLOGY
The research methodology for this thesis consists of three components.  The first 
component is an examination of all relevant history concerning mercenaries, soldiers for 
hire, and private military companies.  The examination also focuses on the critiques, 
limitations, and recommendations expressed by the numerous authors as well as industry 
experts.  The second component is an analysis of a contract the U.S. Government 
currently has with a private company performing security operations in Iraq.  The third 
component is an analysis of the information gathered in the first two components to 
identify missions that could best be outsourced to Private Military Companies. 
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I is a broad overview of this thesis and lays out the general roadmap of 
the research through a purpose, research questions, organization, and methodology.
Chapter II provides a brief overview of the history of mercenaries from ancient 
times until the late twentieth century. 
Chapter III is an examination of two operations conducted by the PMC named 
Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone in the 1990’s.   The focus of the 
examination is on their effectiveness, both economically and militarily; this chapter 
answers the first research question.  
Chapter IV provides a brief overview of the ethical considerations that arise with 
the use of private military actors and specifically PMC’s.  
Chapter V answers the second research question by giving three possibilities for 
PMC use within U.S. foreign policy.  Additionally, it speaks to the issues that must be 
resolved before using private military actors and provides a feasible solution that 
addresses those issues.
Chapter VI examines a current cost plus fixed-fee (CPFF) contract the 
Government has with a private company providing security in Iraq. 
Chapter VII summarizes the findings of the research and presents 
recommendations for further research and study.
3F. BENEFITS OF STUDY
The primary benefit of this thesis is to explore an outsourcing capability that the 
U.S. Government has not taken advantage of yet.  This thesis pulls together previous 
research on various topics relating to private military actors into a research topic that has 
not yet been addressed in any body of work to be found.  The following body of work 
provides upper-echelon Government officials a provocative topic to consider when 
formulating foreign policy in the future.
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5II. SOLDIERS FOR HIRE: A BRIEF HISTORY      
A. INTRODUCTION
War and violence are as old as man himself.  From the time that Cain killed Abel, 
man has pitted himself against both brother and foreigner alike in a never-ending attempt 
to gain power or defend against aggression.  Throughout the ages, many men have made 
war or the conduct of war their life’s blood.  From the first divisions of labor, some have 
chosen to earn their living by taking up the sword against their fellow man.2   These 
“mercenaries” have found no shortage of work, as there are always those who lack the 
fortitude, taste, ability, or comparative advantage to take up arms themselves.3  Once
professional soldiers emerged, militiamen, or those who take up the sword because of 
patriotism or as a last resort, became less likely to succeed in combat when pitted against 
hired soldiers.4
According to Anthony Mockler, “a history of mercenaries would be very little 
less than a history of warfare throughout the ages.”5  However, to properly portray their 
history, we must first agree on what constitutes a mercenary.  Many authors and 
historians have come up with diverse definitions of exactly what a mercenary is.  The 
Dictionary of Military History defines the mercenary as a “man working for money.”6
But this is not nearly specific enough for our discussion here.  Another definition, 
provided by Janice Thompson, describes the quintessential soldier of fortune as “one who 
        2 Frederic C. Lane, Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence Controlling Enterprises 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), p. 51.
3 Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier: peace and war and the Sandline affair (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 
1999), pp. 29-30.
4 William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 77.
5 Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries, (New York: Paragon House, 1987), p. 15.
6 Andre Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 
p. 501.
6fights for an employer other than his home state and whose motivation is economic.”7
Ultimately a mercenary is loosely defined by three characteristics: “being a specialist, 
stateless, and paid.”8
Tim Spicer, a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the Scots Guard, and the former head 
of the now defunct Sandline International, says that recent public opinion views the 
mercenary as “a hired thug who will serve any cause and do any dirty work, provided the 
price is right.”9  This definition is too harsh.  Only in recent times has it become popular 
to look at mercenaries as immoral and their business a dirty trade.  From the dawn of 
history until very recently, this attitude would seem absurd.  In fact, in the Middle Ages, 
being a professional soldier was to be in one of the noblest professions.10  As man 
progressed and moved away from his tribal beginnings, soldiers for hire were used more 
and more.11  Many nations and empires owe their success and even their very existence 
to the ability of soldiers for hire.12
It has been said that money is the root of all evil.  While this is debatable, money 
is definitely the underlying motivation for soldiers for hire.  Spicer would argue that 
some men just enjoy soldiering as a way of making a living, using their skills to do 
something at which they are good.13 However, it is doubtful that these men would take 
part in this enjoyable activity if there were no financial gain involved.  Money alone, 
however, cannot make a man take up arms and risk his life; there must be something that 
calls him to this undertaking.  There must be within him a desire for violence.  As 
Mockler puts it, the trademark of the mercenary is “a devotion to war for its own sake.”14
Mercenaries have taken part in nearly every battle ever fought.  From the time of 
the Ancient Greeks, to the Roman Empire, to Feudal Europe, and even until the modern 
7 Janice E. Thompson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), p. 26.
8 Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (New York: Blackwell, 1984), p. 99.
9 Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, p. 29.
10 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 501.
11 Anthony Mockler, Mercenaries (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 16.
12 Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, p. 33.
13 Ibid., p. 30.
14 Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 21.
7day, they have almost always had their place on the battlefield.  The main reason for their 
endurance has been their effectiveness.  They achieved superior results at a better value 
than their militia-man counterparts.15  Their experience allowed them to become more 
efficient and to gain a technological advantage.  They, in turn, sold their skills to a bidder 
who valued their “expertise in military technology as well as their professional skills.”16
B. ANCIENT HISTORY
One of the earliest records of mercenary use was by the Pharaohs of ancient 
Egypt.  At the Battle of Kadesh (1300 BC), Pharaoh Ramses II employed 5,000 Ne’arim, 
Canaanite mercenaries, in his battle formations.  Egypt’s enemy, the Hittites, ruled by 
king Muwatallish, was a force of about 16,000.  A portion of these troops, approximately 
3,500, were charioteers of noble lineage.  These chariots were supported by an infantry of 
mercenaries and vassals, predominantly of Syrian and Canaanite lineage.17  Additionally, 
the pharaohs of both the Old and Middle Kingdoms employed Libyan and Nubian archers 
while the New Kingdom pharaohs augmented their forces with Libyans, Gauls, 
Thracians, and Greek Hopelites.18
The Bible also includes a few instances of mercenary use.  In the Old Testament’s 
book of Exodus, as the Pharaoh chased the children of Israel out of Egypt, his army, that 
included mercenary augments, was overcome by the waters of the Red Sea.  Generations 
later, before David became King of Israel, he and his followers were employed in the 
Philistine army of Achish.19  Later, King Amaziah of Judah paid 100 silver talents to 
100,000 valiant Israeli warriors to aid in Judah’s defense.20
Ancient Greece is remembered as the birthplace of democracy and as a mighty 
civilization that conquered much of their known world.  However, paying high wages to 
15 John Haldon, Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204 (London: UCL Press, 
1999), p. 92.
16 Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, pp. 30, 32.
17 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, pp. 359, 421.
18 Ibid., pp. 502, 684.
19 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), p. 20.
20 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p.239.
8soldiers became necessary in order to conduct these longer offensive campaigns.21  It 
became obvious that the army could no longer be composed of farmers and businessmen; 
these workers were the backbone of the Greek economy and were needed at home.22
Instead, starting in the 4th Century BC, mercenaries were called upon to fill the 
responsibility previously held by a compulsory army.23  In fact, the Greeks fleshed out 
not only their army but also their large-scale fleeted navy with hired soldiers from Asia 
Minor and others societies along the Aegean coast.24  Moreover, shortly after the Greco-
Persian Wars, the Athenian fleets predominantly became a mercenary service.25
During the course of the Peloponnesian war, the large scale use of mercenaries 
developed.26  Their specialized skills were put to use as archers, slingers, and javelin-
throwers.27  However, it was not only the soldier for hire that proliferated, but this time 
period also saw the emergence of the mercenary-leading professional officer.28  One 
famous example is the mercenary Iphicrates, an Athenian commander who transformed 
the Greek phalanx from a barbarian undertaking into a disciplined professional force.29
Mercenary captains such as Iphicrates could be considered the forefathers of the 
condottieri, who emerged hundreds of years later in Feudal Italy.
The next major empire of the time, the Persians, also used mercenaries from 
among their conquered victims.  It is said the “great empires employed mercenaries more 
than other states.”30  The Persians were no exception.  They reinforced their native 
cavalry with hired Scythian and Indian soldiers.31  Darius III, the Persian Emperor 
infamously known for being defeated by Alexander the Great, had previously hired 
21 Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), p.144.
22 Delbruck, History of the Art of War, p. 146.
23 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 688.
24Ibid., p. 558.
25 Delbruck, History of the Art of War, p. 145.
26 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 557.
27 Van Crevald, Martin, The Rise and Decline of the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 31.
28 Delbruck, History of the Art of War, p. 149.
29 Ibid., p. 151.
30 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 502.
31 Delbruck, History of the Art of War, p. 212.
910,000 Greek soldiers to assist his army in its wars.  These 10,000 became famous after 
Darius terminated their service and unsuccessfully tried to murder them.  They escaped, 
and their story was later recorded by Xenopon32 as one of history’s first novels.33
The Previously mentioned Alexander the Great conquered his vast empire not 
with a Macedonian army, but with a force consisting mostly of mercenaries.  Part of this 
force was a 224-ship navy hired from the Phoenicians.34  Upon his death, Alexander 
divided his kingdom among four of his generals, the Diadochi.  It was only due to 
mercenaries that these successors were able to establish their own kingdoms.35  The 
Diadochi assimilated these hired barbarians into the Macedonian-Greek system of 
warfare.36
C. ROMAN TIMES
Less than a hundred years later in 241 BC, Carthage was defeated by the Roman 
Republic in the first of three Punic Wars.  The Second Punic war (218-212 BC) saw 
Carthage regain the upper hand as Hannibal led an army of well-trained mercenaries over 
the Alps into northern Italy.  Other than high-ranking officers, all members of Hannibal’s 
force were contracted soldiers.37  Because Carthage had no compulsory service, they 
recruited hired soldiers from Spain, Gaul, Italy, Greece, and Numidia.38  Additionally, 
Hannibal employed a force of shepherd sling-shooters from the Balearic Islands against 
the Romans.39  Ultimately, the Carthaginian downfall in the third Punic War was the 
Roman capture of their silver mines in Spain.  This left the Carthaginians unable to pay 
their hired soldiers and led to their utter defeat and destruction at the hands of the 
Romans.40
32 Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, pp. 30-31.
33 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p.21.
34 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 21.
35 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 502.
36 Delbruck, History of the Art of War, p. 235.
37 Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 16.
38 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 110.
39 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mercenary#Mercenaries_in_the_classic_era,, [Accessed 
June 6, 2005].
40 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 21.
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Although most would think the patriotic citizen serving in the legion to be the 
typical soldier of the Roman Empire, this is not altogether true.  Even from the beginning, 
when Rome was only a Republic battling Carthage, mercenaries were employed to fill 
out the ranks.41  In fact, in 213 BC, Rome persuaded the mercenary Celtibri to defect 
from Hannibal’s army and pledge allegiance to the Roman cause.42  Later, Both Marcus 
Crassus and Julius Caesar augmented their legions with Gallic horsemen.  These 
mercenaries were rewarded not only with pay, but also with Roman citizenship after 
completing their years of service.43  Recruiting was not limited to Gaul; all the Provinces 
of the Roman Empire provided hired soldiers.  Numidians, Balearics, Iberians, Cretans, 
and Greeks filled specialty gaps within the Roman legions.44  It was the Germanic tribes 
who developed the best reputation, however, and Rome employed these tribes to help 
fend off the Mongol invasions.45  Thus, by the end of the third century, the Roman Army 
“was more Germanic than Roman.”46  One interesting note: after the Roman legions 
began using high-priced mercenaries, they developed a medical service to provide for 
them.47
The Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire, as it has become known, continued the 
trend of importing soldiers for hire into their military service.  They referred to these 
allied barbarians as foedarati.48  While their usage was only a small part of the Empire’s 
total force, it was crucial because of the mercenary’s high probability for success when 
engaged.  These full-time professionals provided a greater value for the money and were 
much more tactically effective than their militia counterparts.49  As well as being 
effective, they were also loyal.50  Because the emperor controlled the treasury, the use of 
41 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 21.
42 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 502.
43 Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, p. 31.
44 Delbruck, History of the Art of War, p. 413.
45 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 503.
46 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 21.
47 Corvisier, A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, p. 494.
48 Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography, p. 469.
49 Haldon, John, Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World, p. 92.
50 Ibid., p. 93.
11
hired soldiers provided the emperor with a high degree of control over his forces.  As 
long as they were paid on time, mercenaries were more reliable and less likely to become 
involved in internal Byzantine politics.51  Their major interest was in earning their living, 
which in some cases was paid to them on a monthly basis.52
In the 533 AD battle of Ticameron, the Byzantine General Belisarius added Hun 
mercenaries to his cavalry and personal bodyguard to defeat the Vandals.53  Probably the 
best-known hired soldiers of the time were the Varangian Guard, a force of elite Norse 
axe-men, who were54 hired as the emperor’s personal guard.  They were so loyal that 
when the Normans attacked Constantinople, they died to the last man in defense of the 
emperor.55  Other elite corps hired by the empire include the “Exkoubitoi, the Athanatoi 
(the immortals), and the Vestiaritai.”56  By the eleventh century, the employment of 
mercenaries “who continued to fight with order and discipline according to their own 
traditions and battlefield loyalties”57 provided most of Byzantine’s royal armies.58
D. MIDDLE AGES
After the Roman Empire fell, Western Europe submerged into the Dark Ages and 
the system of feudalism developed.  In feudalism, military service became a product of 
reciprocal obligation among lords, vassals, and fiefs.59  However, there were many 
limitations on the feudal system.  Duty-bound soldiers were not obligated to serve abroad 
and this presented a barrier to offensive operations.  Therefore, many monarchs turned to 
mercenaries in order to wage campaigns abroad.60  As the feudal system broke down, the 
concept of rewarding soldiers with land was replaced with rewarding them with money 
51 Haldon, John, Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World, pp. 93, 269.
52 Ibid., p. 126.
53 Franklin D. Margiotta, Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography (Washington: 
Brassey’s, 1994), p. 141.
54 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 21-22.
55 Spicer, An Unorthodox Warrior, p. 31.
56 Haldon, Warfare, State, and Society in the Byzantine World, p. 93.
57 Ibid., p. 225.
58Ibid., p. 125.
59 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 22.
60 Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, p. 27.
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and gold.  The typical soldier was no longer a peasant, but predominantly a full-time 
professional who was hired and trained by the monarch.61
As war in the Middle Ages became more protracted and vassals became less eager 
to submit to their obligated military service, the system of scutage, or shield money, was 
introduced.62  This tax, instituted in 1159 by King Henry II of England63 “allowed 
individuals to buy their way out of their military obligations.”64  These cash payments 
were then used by the king to hire soldiers who would fight in the vassal’s stead.  By the 
end of the fifteenth century, mercenaries had essentially replaced their feudal 
forerunners.65  Therefore, as long as a king could afford to pay for an army, he had a 
willing fighting force at his disposal.66
The supply of mercenary troops continued to grow as the sovereign became more 
dependent on their service.  Most laws of inheritance benefited only the eldest son.  
Therefore, any subsequent younger brothers had to seek their fortunes elsewhere; in 
feudal Europe this was most easily done as a mercenary.67  As this situation became more 
prevalent, the supply of mercenaries became greater than the amount of war demanded.68
When there was peace or no war for these ‘free lances’ to fight in, they formed together 
as “free companions.”69
E. FREE COMPANIES
‘Free Companies’ thrived in medieval Europe from about 1300-1450.70  Free 
companies were the precursor to the modern-day private military company and acted as 
“corporate entities dedicated to making profit.”71  They banded together with a safety-in-
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numbers mentality and went looking for work, blackmailing towns and villages along the 
way.72  They would offer their services to anyone willing to pay and terrorize those who 
would not.73  From 1300 to 1375, several waves of mercenaries crossed the Alps into 
Italy in search of more constant employment. The first and most famous of these were the 
Almogavares, an armor-less band of professional infantry hailing from the territories of 
Aragon and Navarre.  They would eventually become known as the Grand Catalan 
Company.  After terrorizing Italy briefly, they made their way to Constantinople and took 
up service for the Byzantine Emperor against the Turks.  They later moved to Athens 
where they remained in power for sixty-three years.  This was quite a remarkable feat as 
“no company or band of mercenaries has ever before or after achieved such political 
power and held it for so long.”74
Other infamous free companies of the time include: the Knights of the Dove, the 
Company of St. George, the Great Company, and the White Company.  The latter was 
organized by the Englishmen Sir John Hawkwood who helped successfully transform the 
goal of free companies.  No longer would they only exploit individual members of 
society for profit.  Henceforth, they would enter into the service of an entire city or 
region, which they would protect.75  Anthony Mockler recalls a short story about 
Hawkwood: Two friars passed him by and customarily greeted him with ‘God give you 
peace!’ to which he replied ‘God take away your alms!’  They assured him they meant no 
wrong.  To which Hawkwood replied ‘How when you pass by me and pray that God 
would make me die of hunger?  Do you not know that I live by war and that peace would 
ruin me?’76  Such were the men that did battle at that time.
The final foreign free company on the Italian peninsula was that of the Bretons.  
Hereafter, the Italian states only employed Italian mercenaries, which ultimately gave rise 
to the condottieri.77  However, the free companies were not yet on the decline.  The 
72 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 24.
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74 Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 53.
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Hundred Year War (1337-1453) between England and France saw one of the largest 
concentrations yet as both sides employed mercenaries.  In the interlude between battles, 
these unemployed soldiers merely lived off the countryside.  It was not uncommon for 
the French King to mount a campaign to neighboring countries, such as Spain and 
Hungary, with his only aim being to rid France of these hordes.78  At the battle of 
Brignais (1362), these companies united against a common threat; a feudal army sent by 
the French King to eradicate them.  It was their crowning achievement and only a 
forecast of what was to come.79
On May 26th, 1445 King Charles VII of France signed the Grande Ordonnance.  
This sanctioned certain mercenary captains and made them royal officers.  These officers 
were paid by the King based on the number of soldiers they had fighting for them.  Those 
mercenaries not sanctioned were effectively outlawed.  Thus with this one law the French 
created a standing army responsible to the crown.  The King then used this army to 
forcibly rid the countryside of those companies, which he had not sanctioned.  This 
standing army, the first in Western Europe since the fall of Rome, enabled the French to 
drive off the English and effectively end the Hundred Years War.80
F. CONDOTTIERI
After the defeat of the Bretons in 1380, foreign-born free companies ceased to 
exist in Italy.81  Hereafter, in an attempt to increase allegiance with the mercenary 
captains they hired, Italian states recruited only native Italians to wage their wars and 
provide protection.82  Thus, states would enter into a contract, or condotta, with an 
independent Italian mercenary captain contractor, or condottieri.  These condottas were 
very specific.  They outlined rates of pay, duration of length, specific tasks to be 
accomplished, and the number, as well as type, of soldiers to be used.83 Other than a 
devotion to the terms of the condotta, there was no illusion of loyalty by either party.  
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This was purely a business relationship.84  As such, these condottieri could be considered 
the truest mercenaries that the world has ever seen; their loyalties were governed merely 
by the lengths of their contracts.85
Three basic types of condottas were used.  The first, a Condotta a soldo disteso,
was for a native-born captain, with a preset number of soldiers, and called for active 
service.  The second, a Condotta a mezzo soldo, was not as strict as the first.  It stated that 
the condottieri could roam free in the enemy’s land, plundering and raiding, as they 
desired.  The last, a Condotta in aspetto, was nothing more than “a retainer paid to the 
condottieri in a time of peace in order to maintain their loyalty.”86
In 1454 the Peace of Lodi was signed between Venice and Milan.  War was 
waged less frequently and the profession of the hired soldier became overcrowded.87
Every time a condotta expired, soldiers had to search out new employment.  If none 
could be found, they would either have to change occupations and make their living 
peacefully, or plunder for a living.  These professional soldiers preferred a guaranteed 
wage to the gambles of plunder or the dreariness of a peaceful vocation.  Therefore, the 
benefits of entering into longer-term contracts became apparent.  Subsequently, “long-
term associations between a particular captain and a given city became normal.”88  The 
larger Italian states had all formed permanent armies of condottieri by the middle of the 
fifteenth century.89  In times of peace they would often receive only half wages.90
With the current arrangement, the fear of coups d’etat was always present.  
Therefore, the civil officials of the various states created a “corps of officers whose 
careers depended more on ties with civil officials who had the power of appointment and 
less on ties with the particular soldiers who from time to time might come under a given 
84 Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 45.
85 Ibid., p 20.
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officer’s command.”91  Exceptional condottieri rapidly became part of the ruling class in 
Italian cities.92  At the end of the fifteenth century the distinction had become blurred; 
“condottieri had become dukes, and dukes had become condottieri.”93
G. SWISS AND GERMANS
By the end of the fifteenth century, Europe was full of fighting soldiers such as 
the German landsknecht and the Swiss Pike troops who would flock to every corner of 
the continent to join a fight.94  The Swiss were from an infertile poor land, and were 
therefore more than willing to export their citizen’s special skills in war-fighting. Every 
emerging dynasty of the fifteenth and sixteenth century contained an element of the 
Swiss or German mercenary.95  “Pas d’argent, pas de Swisses (no money, no Swiss)”96
became a common saying of the time.  The Swiss evolved into a highly specialized 
fighting force that was the most sought after in Europe.  They put their military skills 
with pikes and halberds at the disposal of any willing buyer; for them, war became a 
“nationalized industry.”97  Their tactics and savagery filled their enemies with terror.  In 
a time when it took most armies months to marshal their forces, their ability to organize 
quickly was a major reason for their success.98  On January 22, 1506, the great warrior 
Pope Julius II created the corps of Swiss Guards who serve as the Vatican Guard even to 
this day.99
In response to the threat posed by the Swiss, Emperor Maximilian organized the 
landsknecht.100  As opposed to the Swiss who hailed from the mountains, the name 
landsknecht literally means “a foot soldier of the plains.”101  They recruited from a much 
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broader geographical area than did the Swiss and the range of social classes who served 
within their ranks was also greater.102  In fact, not only did the nobility raise these armies,
but also they served as foot soldiers within their ranks.  It was entirely customary for 
nobly-born Germans “to trail a pike.”103  The landsknecht were even more vicious and 
barbarous than the Swiss.104  They were mercenary pike units that “fought neither for
king nor cause, but for cash.”105  Later when tactics began to change, they were more 
flexible than the Swiss; they were able to successfully incorporate gunpowder into their 
fighting.106
H. FAR EAST
So far the discussion has centered mainly on the use of mercenaries by the great 
kingdoms of Europe and Eurasia and other countries of the same geographical area.  
However, other areas of the world also used soldiers for hire in their armies.  In fact, the 
Far East has a rich military history that includes the use of mercenaries in several 
dynasties by countries such as Japan, India, and China.107  For instance, in China’s Sung 
dynasty (960-1279), Huns and Mongols were employed to supplement the main 
forces.108  Several hundred years later in the 1920’s, white Russian officers were used as 
both military instructors and officers by Chinese Generals.109  Less than twenty years 
later, during the early stages of the Second World War, retired U.S. Air Corps Major 
Claire Chennault led the ‘Flying Tigers’ against the Japanese on behalf of the Chinese 
Government.110
Babur founded the Mughal Empire of the Indian sub-continent in 1526.  When 
waging war, Babur commanded an army that consisted not only of his loyal Turkish 
soldiers but also of “Afghan tribesman, Mongol freebooters, Persian mercenaries, and 
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Indianized Turks from Delhi, as well as Rajput and other Hindu levees.”111  The empire 
flourished for nearly 200 years until the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb.  However, 
from around 1600 until nearly the 1860’s, India was the stage of a new breed of soldier 
for hire: the military business venture.
The two most famous of these ventures were the English and Dutch East India 
Companies (EIC’s).112  These companies were not hired by India, but instead were little 
more than “an extension to their [home] government’s power.”113  Originally formed as 
trading companies, they quickly began competing against each other militarily in order to 
gain the upper hand and expel competitors.  In fact, the Dutch East India Company (EIC) 
was “established for the purpose of doing Spain as much damage as possible” as well as 
“preying on Spanish shipping.”114  The Dutch EIC hired Indonesian, European, and local 
Indian mercenaries to conduct these ‘trading’ operations.115  But it was not only the 
Dutch; the English EIC also hired mercenaries.  Originally the English recruited Indian 
mercenaries, but later came to depend mostly on Swiss and German mercenaries as they 
battled their rivals, the French, for supremacy.116
I. MODERN AGE
As Europe moved out from under the dark cloud of the Middle Ages into the 
modern era, “war became the biggest industry in Europe.”117  No one benefited from this 
more than the Bohemian military entrepreneur Count Albrecht von Wallenstein.  In 1625, 
he was appointed to commission an army for the Holy Roman Emperor.  He not only 
provided the army, but also manufactured the military equipment, weapons, and 
foodstuffs at his Bohemian estate.  He was not only a powerful political figure in charge 
of the largest army within Germany,118 but also became the wealthiest man in all of 
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Europe with control of territory from the Baltic to Bohemia.119  The Thirty Year War 
(1618-1648), a religious war centered in Germany, was fought predominantly by 
mercenaries who were recruited by colonels and captains.120  The Seven Year War 
(1756-1763) was funded by English gold and saw English generals lead their allies’ 
troops into battle.  The English used Dutch and Austrians in Europe and native Sepoys in 
India.121
In the eighteenth century, almost every powerful European army contained
elements of hired foreign-born soldiers.  The only exception in Europe to have never used 
mercenaries is Switzerland.  The Pre-Revolution French Army was one-third German.  In 
the Baltic Sea Fleet, eighty percent of the officers were not Russian.  Moreover, in 
Bavaria and Russia, the proportions of foreign-born officers were forty and thirty-three 
percent respectively.  The proportion of foreigners in the Prussian army ranged from one 
third to as much as two thirds.122
J. THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
The British principally relied on a professional army of volunteers to police their 
Colonial Empire.123  However, whenever it best suited their interests, they never failed to 
hire mercenary soldiers.  This was precisely the case during the American War for 
Independence.  The British crown feared that their whole army, consisting of only 30,000 
troops, would not be able to stand up to the 50,000-man militia the Americans were 
expected to field.124  After unsuccessfully attempting to procure troops from the Russians 
and the Dutch,125 the British struck a deal with Germany for nearly 30,000 additional 
soldiers.  Of these, approximately 17,000 were supplied by the Landsgrave of Hesse-
Cassel.126  Therefore, the soldiers were referred to as ‘Hessians’ by the Americans.  The 
Hessians were used at Fort Washington, Red Bush, and Yorktown, just to mention a few.  
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Alongside these German mercenaries, the British also employed various tribes of 
American Indians to supplement their traditional ‘red-coat’ forces.127   However, the 
Hessians were not as successful as first expected; at Trenton, George Washington bested 
a force of Hessians and a significant number of them surrendered at Saratoga Springs.128
K. NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, Europe was beginning the Napoleonic 
wars.  The French augmented their forces with hired Polish lancers to battle the British.  
Not to be outdone, England contracted the King’s German Legion, an elite group of 
infantry and cavalry.129  Additionally, the British impressed over six thousand U.S. 
citizens into their royal navy.  Unfortunately for the British, this action was one of the 
actions that brought on the War of 1812.130  Other nineteenth-century examples include 
Simon Bolivar’s recruitment of over 5,000 British mercenaries to fight in the Spanish 
Colonies’ War for Independence, Bavarian mercenaries being utilized in the 1823 Greek 
War of Independence, and Brazil employing Irish and German mercenaries to battle 
Argentina in 1830.  Additionally, Spain, Portugal, and Mexico also hired mercenaries to 
augment their forces.131  The aforementioned British were the last state to raise a 
complete army of foreigners with which to wage war.  In 1854 they hired 16,500 
German, Italian, and Swiss mercenaries to battle Russia in the Crimean War.  Although 
no states contracted large-scale foreign armies after 1854, the concept of employing 
mercenaries did not go away.132
The two most famous mercenary groups of the current age are the Nepalese 
Gurkhas employed by India and Britain, and the French Foreign Legion.  The French 
Foreign Legion was officially created in March of 1831 by a decree of King Louis-
Phillippe.  They were originally created in order to rid France of the large number of 
stateless persons who flooded into their borders after the Napoleonic Wars.  Their first 
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use was in France’s war with Algeria.  The legion was broken up and reorganized several 
times over the following years, but has become legendary as the elite force within the 
French armed forces.133  It is the only standing force in the world that is composed of 
multiple foreign nationalities.  As of 1983, over one hundred nationalities served within 
the Legion’s ranks.134
The British were so impressed with the ferocity and tenacity of their Gurkha 
adversaries during their war with Nepal (circa. 1815) that they actively sought to recruit 
them into the British army after the war.  The subsequent Treaty of Segauli between 
Britain and Nepal gave Britain the right to recruit Nepalese citizens into their armed 
forces.  For the next hundred years the Gurkhas cemented their reputation in countless 
battles under the Union Jack.  In 1947, as Britain granted independence to India, Nepal 
allowed Gurkhas to serve in both the British and Indian armies under the Kathmandu 
Agreement.  The agreement demanded that Gurkhas always receive the same pay as the 
home countries’ soldiers and that they never be forced to fight against fellow Gurkhas.  In 
1980, there were nearly 100,000 Gurkhas in the Indian army and approximately 8,000 in 
the British army, though present-day numbers are much lower.135  To this day, their 
reputation for courage and bravery still precedes them.
Employment of mercenaries took on four basic forms in the twentieth century.  
First, individual foreigners were permanently employed in another state’s standing army.  
The most famous example of this is the French Foreign Legion, which was discussed 
earlier.  The second form is a foreigner force employed via a contract or treaty between 
two nations; Britain employing the Nepalese Gurkhas is the best example.  Third, 
individual foreigners were hired by state governments to take part in specific battles and 
conflicts.  This brand of mercenary flourished in Africa during the second half of the 
twentieth century.  Last, one state would reimburse a second state for the use of their 
troops.  This was done by the United States during the Vietnam War and will be 
examined in a later section.136
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Many countries employed foreigners in their standing armies during the twentieth 
century.  In fact, as recently as 1980, eighteen states’ standing armies contained 
foreigners.  The Omani army was almost entirely mercenary until 1970.  Moreover, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) army was nearly all foreign, consisting of troops from both 
Oman and Yemen and led by officers from Britain, Jordan, and Pakistan.  Britons and 
Pakistanis also made up the officer base of the Qatar army.  Additionally, approximately 
one-half of the Kuwaiti army was composed of Iraqi and Saudi tribesmen prior to 
Saddam’s invasion in 1990.  During the eighties in Saudi Arabia, around 30,000 
Pakistanis were employed as combat troops in exchange for billion-dollar aid packages to 
the Pakistani government.  Elsewhere, thousands of Pakistanis were employed in Libya’s 
Islamic Legion in 1981.137  In the twentieth century Middle East, Pakistan played a 
similar role to the one played by Switzerland centuries earlier in Europe.138  Elsewhere, 
Greek officers served in the Cyprus army while French officers were employed by both 
the Ivory Coast and Cameroon.  Lastly, the Solomon Islands hired Fijian soldiers and 
British officers for service in their armed forces.139
As stated earlier, mercenaries, or ‘Dogs of War’140 ran rampant in Africa during 
the last part of the twentieth century.  From 1960 to 1968, both warring sides of the 
Congo Crisis employed hired soldiers from France, South Africa, Rhodesia, Spain, Italy, 
Britain, and Belgium.  Later in the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), both sides employed 
mercenaries in their struggle to gain power.  Angola and Rhodesia also witnessed an 
influx of foreign mercenaries who were paid to take up arms for a cause that was not their 
own.141  These recruits were predominantly white-skinned non-Africans who gravitated 
to the continent seeking out money and war.  Later in the nineties, the paramilitary 
company Executive Outcomes was contracted by the governments of Angola and Sierra 
Leone to battle insurgents and do the buying government’s bidding.
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L. U. S. AND MERCENARIES
The idea of using mercenaries is abhorrent to many Americans.  The foundation 
for this mindset can be traced back to the very origins of the country.  In its first ever war, 
the War for Independence from Britain, the fledgling U. S. was attacked by mercenaries, 
specifically the German Hessians and American Indians hired by the British.  The current 
perception among the general population is that the United States has never resorted to 
using mercenaries.  This is only somewhat true, however.  According to Anthony 
Mockler “the United States is almost the only imperial power in history that has never 
employed mercenary troops directly (and only with reluctance and secrecy 
indirectly).”142   While the U. S. has never hired a complete foreign army to fight a war, 
it has contracted for foreign assets with which to complement its own assets.  Even in the 
Revolutionary War, when America’s original distaste for mercenaries was being formed, 
the Continental Army was countering the German Hessians with its own mercenaries, the 
Royal Deux Ponts Regiment, a German unit hired by the French.143  Additionally, Baron 
Von Steuben, another contracted European, was employed to train the soldiers at Valley 
Forge and was instrumental in shaping the Continental Army into a veritable force.144
America’s indirect use of mercenaries did not end in the Revolutionary War.  At 
the behest of President Thomas Jefferson, William Eaton, the U.S. naval agent for the 
Barbary regencies, led an army 600 miles across the desert of Tripoli in the First Barbary 
War (1804).  The army consisted of a detachment of U.S Marines as well as 500 Arab, 
Greek, Turkish, and European mercenaries.  Their mission was to overthrow the current 
leader of Tripoli and replace him with his exiled brother Hamet, the rightful heir to the 
throne.  The subsequent Battle of Derna was a success for the American forces.  
Afterwards, Hamet presented the Marines with a Mameluke sword because he was so 
impressed with their bravery.  To this day, the legend is forever remembered with the line 
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“to the shores of Tripoli” in the Marine Corps Hymn.  However, the battle was stopped 
short due to a treaty signed by the two governments, and the mercenaries were never fully 
paid.145
During the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865) the Union army profited from the use of 
European officers who had fled the unsuccessful European Revolutions of 1848.146  A 
decade after the Civil War in 1878, the percentage of enlisted personnel in the U.S. Navy 
who were foreign-born was 60%.  This was despite a legal directive that two thirds of all 
“seaman be native-born U.S. citizens.”147
During the Vietnam War, the U.S. Government augmented its forces with troops 
from South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines.  The separate contracts with each 
government called for the U.S. to pay “an overseas allowance, a per-diem for each 
soldier, plus an additional allowance according to rank” in exchange for the military 
personnel’s use.  In addition, the U.S. paid all expenses related to deploying these forces 
and reimbursed each providing country for the cost of finding replacements in their 
native army.148  Additionally, the U.S. also used ethnic Vietnamese to battle against the 
Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army during the war.  These Nung and Montagnard 
tribesman were supplied and trained by the CIA and U.S. Special Forces.149  Moreover, 
in 1966 General William Westmoreland explored the option of hiring British Gurkhas for 
use in the Vietnam War, although this plan did not come to fruition.150
M. CONCLUSION
Throughout history, many have maligned mercenaries and their trade.  Probably 
the most famous of these is Machiavelli, an Italian political philosopher and theorist of 
the late fifteenth century.  Living in Italy during the prevalence of the condottieri, he 
most likely had good reason to be critical of hired soldiers.  However, some of his 
writings concerning the conduct and performance of mercenaries have been deemed to be 
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inaccurate.  For instance, “Machiavelli’s scornful accusation that they (condottieri) 
fought bloodless battles is not borne out by the facts.”151  Additionally, he opined that 
mercenaries were incompetent and lacked the basic will to fight; he complained they 
commonly fought battles between thousands of troops where only a few casualties 
resulted.  This is also grossly overstated.152
Ultimately, the hired soldier could do no right in Machiavelli’s eyes; he made 
several contradictory comments about their behavior.  He accused them of “being 
incapable cowards and of being only too ferociously efficient”153 and “of being both too 
warlike and not warlike enough.”154  Mercenaries, for the most part were not the 
initiators of war; they merely were pawns that sovereigns used to wage war.155
Moreover, when compared to the sovereigns who employed them, hired soldiers were 
mere amateurs at duplicity and deceit.156
The main reason for the use of mercenaries throughout history is that they made 
sense economically and tactically.  Their valuable effective war-fighting skills and their 
willingness to use those skills were desirable to rulers whose citizens had no desire or 
little capability to fight.  Their use allowed citizens to pursue their civilian occupations 
and keep up the local economy.  In turn, these citizens paid taxes to the ruler who, in turn, 
paid the soldier for protection or campaigning.  This routine kept cities and states safe.157
The use of mercenaries is an early example of supply-and-demand economics.  As long 
as there were those willing to pay in order to forgo serving in the military, there were 
those who would accept the challenge for that money.
For hundreds, even thousands, of years, mercenaries have been businessmen.  
They provided a superior service, their fighting, to the alternative, civilians fighting, for a 
fee.  Mercenary captains would form armies for kings or cities in return for payment.  
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Poor states with stagnant economies industrialized war and outsourced their citizens’ 
services to anyone who was willing to pay.  Mercenary bands often wore homogenous 
uniforms supplied by their captain; as businessmen concerned with the bottom line, it 
only made sense to buy the cloth in bulk and have it cut identically for everyone.158  It is 
not by chance that individual soldiers were called ‘freelancers’, or that together they 
formed ‘companies’, and signed contracts (condotta).  Even though the use of 
mercenaries is not as prevalent today as it was centuries before, the mercenary has 
endured because he consistently provides the customer with an efficient and valuable 
service when others will not.
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III. CASE STUDIES: 
EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES’ SUCCESS IN WESTERN AFRICA 
A. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, Executive Outcomes (EO), a now-defunct private military company 
based in South Africa, became “the world’s first fully equipped corporate army.”159  The 
firm promised five services it could offer its potential clients: “strategic and tactical 
military advisory services; an array of sophisticated military training packages in land, 
sea, and air warfare; peacekeeping or ‘persuasion’160 services; advice to armed forces on 
weapons selection and acquisition; and paramilitary services.”161  EO was no ‘fly by 
night’ operation; it was a legitimate business organization with substantial resources to 
accomplish its mission.  Its success stemmed from its use of air power, in-depth 
intelligence, and superior experience.  Angola and Sierra Leone were two countries that 
contracted with EO for military support.  Specifics on each individual case are discussed 
below.  In both cases, EO quickly worked towards accomplishing the goals its employers 
established, defeated a numerically superior force, and proved more efficient in terms of 
both results and cost than the state-run military forces that followed.
B. OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Executive Outcomes’ greatest capability was “its use of intelligence capabilities 
to build a profile of enemy activities.”162  It used radio intercepts, human intelligence, 
and aerial reconnaissance to build as complete a picture of the battlefield as possible.  EO 
then targeted the enemies operations with air strikes, helicopter attacks, and indirect fire 
capabilities such as mortars.  EO maintained the momentum of these attacks and followed 
159 Thomas K. Adams, “New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict,” Parameters, Summer 
1999.
160 No specification is given as to what persuasion entails.  It is most likely a form or armed 
intimidation.
161 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), p. 104, taken from the Executive Outcomes home webpage.
162 David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p. 54.
28
them up with ambushes and ground assaults to ensure the enemy was constantly kept off 
balance.  EO never failed to capitalize on an enemy’s weakness or misstep.163
EO employed many air assets in both operations.  Second-hand American Airlines 
727 passenger jets were used to transport company personnel into theater.  Once in 
theater, its air fleet contained Russian Mi-17 armed transport helicopters, Mi-8 cargo 
helicopters, Mi-24 attack helicopters, and Mig-23 advanced jet bombers.  These assets 
were used to conduct attacks deep within enemy territory.  Furthermore, it became 
standard operating procedure for all ground operations to have the support of at least one 
attack helicopter and a medical transport plane on standby.164  Additionally, EO operated 
two casualty evacuation aircraft that were on constant call.  These medical airships were 
supported by a full-time doctor who was on permanent standby.  As another safety 
precaution, EO procedures mandated that all troop-carrying gunships have a physician on 
board during ground operations.165  As a side-note to medical care, EO was the first 
private military company (PMC) to offer full medical coverage and life insurance for all 
its employees, regardless of position or location of deployment.166
Executive Outcomes was not only successful but also cost effective.  Other than 
the company’s command element, which was permanently employed, EO drew forces 
from its employment pool on an as-needed contractual basis.  Unlike traditional standing 
armies, which must pay for their soldiers even when there is no mission for them, EO did 
not keep forces in the barracks during peacetime.  Instead, EO maintained a database of 
over 2,000 immediately available qualified personnel whom it could call up on very short 
notice;167 these personnel were predominantly ex-South African special force soldiers 
who were very experienced and had previously proven themselves to be capable.  The 
company claimed it could field personnel anywhere in the world within 72 hours.168
163 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 116.
164 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 106.
165 Al J. Venter, “Sierra Leone’s Mercenary War Battle for the Diamond Fields,” Jane’s International 
Defence Review, Nov 1995.
166 Al J. Venter, “How Hired Guns Succeeded where the United Nations Failed,” Jane’s International 
Defence Review, March 1998, p.23.
167 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 103.
168 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, p. 55.
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Another cost saver was the company’s use of cheap ex-Soviet weaponry.  This weaponry 
was readily available on the world market after the fall of the Soviet Union and cost very 
little due to Cold War overproduction.  Additionally, this Russian weaponry was also 
being used by its enemies.  Therefore, EO forces could replenish their supplies every time 
they won an engagement or captured enemy stockpiles.169
C. ANGOLA
In March of 1993, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola) rebels attacked and captured an oil-storage area in the Northern Angolan town of 
Soyo.  Angola’s national defense forces, the FAA (Forcas Armadas Angolanas), were 
unable to defeat and remove the rebels after several attempts.170  The Angolan 
Government subsequently contracted Executive Outcomes to do the job.  EO assembled a 
group of between 50 to 80 hired soldiers to recapture the facility from the numerically 
superior UNITA force.  After a fierce engagement, the rebels were defeated and EO was 
in control of the facility.  This event marked a turning point in the military world; a small 
private military firm was effectively used to accomplish a mission that a national army 
could not.  In fact, after EO forces were relieved by the FAA, the facility at Soyo was 
once again taken by the UNITA rebels.171
Subsequent to the failure of the FAA to maintain any traction against the rebels, 
EO was once again hired by the Angolan Government in September 1993.  In the initial 
one-year, $40 million contract, EO agreed to help train the national forces and direct 
operations against the rebels.172  Over the next two and a half years, 500 EO personnel 
were instrumental in whipping the FAA into a fighting force and helping push back the 
UNITA rebels.173  EO was able to achieve what the powerful militaries of Cuba, East 
Germany, and Russia were unable to achieve in the previous two decades; force 
UNITA’s leader to the negotiation table.174  A peace accord was signed in November of 
169 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 106.
170 Adams, New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict.
171 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 108-109.
172 Ibid., p.109.
173 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention , p. 46.
174 Venter, How Hired Guns Succeeded where the United Nations Failed, p.23.
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1994.  But personal lobbying by President Clinton in December 1995 convinced the 
Angolan Government to terminate the contract with EO.  The subsequent United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping force that replaced EO quickly lost all ground that had been gained 
and the country once again delved into warfare.175
During its nearly 30-month tour, EO never employed more than 500 men at one 
time and charged the Angolan government a total of US$60 million.  In contrast, the UN 
mission in Angola was far more costly in terms of both manpower and money and 
produced vastly inferior results.  Some estimates put the cost at nearly US$1 million a 
day.176  At the height of the UN engagement, 6,000 blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers 
were serving in country.  The final price tag was US$4 billion for the failed four-year 
operation.  After the UN admitted failure and withdrew its troops in the fall of 1999, 
Angola once again succumbed to war that left thousands dead and hundreds of thousands 
homeless.177  In other words, engaging the UN cost 60 times as much as EO had cost and 
resulted in failure.
D. SIERRA LEONE
In the spring of 1995, Marxist Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels were 
threatening to overrun the Sierra Leonean capitol city of Freetown.  Most Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) and foreign embassies had already begun to 
evacuate the country.  In response to this immediate threat, the Sierra Leonean 
Government entered into contract with EO.  The Government established four military 
objectives for EO: “to secure Freetown, to regain control of crucial resources (in 
particular the Sierra Rutile mine and the diamond fields), to destroy the RUF’s 
headquarters, and to clear remaining areas of RUF occupation.”178  EO was able to 
deploy its forces in short order, and within nine days of operations it had not only stopped 
the rebel advance cold, but also had forced the RUF to retreat 126 km into the cover of 
jungle.  After clearing the capitol, EO focused its effort on reclaiming the Kono diamond 
fields in the eastern part of the country.  The return of these mines to Sierra Leonean 
175 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp.109-110.
176 Venter, How Hired Guns Succeeded where the United Nations Failed, p.23.
177 John M. Goshko, “In Angola, UN Peacekeeping Sounds ‘Retreat’,”Washington Post, March 20, 
1999.
178 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, p. 49.
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control provided the Government with much-needed revenue and helped the Government 
pay for the contract with EO.  Such balance had been achieved after less than a year of 
operations that a multi-party presidential election was conducted.179
In November 1996, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, was forced to sign a peace 
agreement.  He later stated that “had EO not intervened, he would have taken Freetown 
and won the war.”180  The fighting in Sierra Leone was finally over, and over a million 
refugees were able to return to their homes.  But the newly elected President, Ahmed  
Kabbah, succumbed to the pressures of the international community and terminated his 
country’s contract with EO in January of 1997.  Three months after EO withdrew, a 
RUF-supported coup toppled Kabbah’s government and chaos engulfed the streets of 
Freetown once again.181
The total charge was US$35 million for Executive Outcomes’ 21-month, roughly 
three hundred and fifty-man operation in Sierra Leone.  In that short time, EO secured the 
capitol city, brought temporary peace to the war-torn country, and restored the country’s 
valuable mineral and diamond mines, which accounted for two-thirds of the country’s 
total export earnings.182  By contrast, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) cost 
US$514 million in 2000 and US$612 million in 2001, as reported by the U.S. State 
Department.183  Moreover, the peace EO had fostered quickly gave way to fighting under 
the UN’s 6,000-18,000-man watch and hit its low point when RUF forces took hostage 
hundreds of UN troops in the spring of 2000.184
E. CONCLUSION
In its operations in Angola and Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes proved that 
private military companies can “offer state forces complementary and efficient 
services.”185  It is not clear what the outcome would have been if the leaders of those two 
179 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 112-113.
180 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, p. 51.
181 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 114.
182 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, pp. 49,51.
183 U.S. State Department Fact Sheet dated 4/12/01.
184 “Sierra Leone” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sierra_leone.htm, [Accessed Aug 
17, 2005].
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countries had not terminated contracts with EO.  However, if Executive Outcomes had 
stayed in each country, it is hard to imagine the situation eroding to the same level it did 
under the U.N. peacekeeping force.  It certainly would have cost the world community 
less money, and would most likely have resulted in less suffering and dying by innocent 
citizens of each country.  Executive Outcomes’ use in both countries proved that private 





Just as in the days of yesteryear, war and violence are not a monopoly of the state.  
The twenty-first century battlefield is much different from the battlefields of a century 
ago.  There are, of course, the examples just given of Executive Outcomes, which carried 
out successful operations in two African countries.  However, one only need look as far 
as his television to see other more recent examples of non-state violence at play.  The 
Taliban and Al Qaeda are two internationally known organizations that are not state run.  
In fact, they have actually promulgated violence against people in one country whose 
government is sympathetic to their causes, namely Saudi Arabia.  These organizations are 
made up of men and women fighting mainly for personally driven causes, not for the 
goals of a particular state.  Moreover, the two aforementioned terrorist organizations are 
not only fighting a coalition of legitimate state-run armies, but also are warring with a 
plethora of private security companies operating within the combat theatre.  
The fact that privatized warfare seems to be here to stay does not mean that one 
must accept military privatization in total.  Even though it has been shown that private 
security companies can provide an economically viable military alternative, there are 
many troubling aspects of military privatization.  Most involve the lack of oversight for 
these companies, and the confusion along the lines of accountability.  Additionally, many 
people are disturbed by the fact that these companies profit from war and suffering and 
ultimately make decisions based upon their bottom lines.186  According to Patrick Cullen, 
the behavior and actions of private military companies (PMC’s) are influenced by three 
different bodies: their home government, their host or employing government, and the 
market.187  This chapter addresses the ethical issues that come up in the use of PMC’s.
As the various ethical considerations of using PMC’s are discussed, it becomes 
apparent that many of the same concerns apply to the use of state-run forces.  In other 
186 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), pp. 216, 218.
187 Patrick Cullen, “Keeping the Dogs of War on a Tight Leash: assessing means of accountability for 
private military companies,” Conflict Trends, June 2000, p. 37.
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words, the use of state-run forces can sometimes lead to the same unintended 
consequences as the use of PMC’s.  Moreover, in many cases, it is conjecture as to 
whether the use of PMC’s will indeed lead to those supposed unintended consequences.  
In fact, some of the arguments given do not actually cite previous shortfalls of PMC’s.  
Instead, the arguments allude to problematic examples that have transpired with the use 
of state-run forces, hypothesizing that the use of PMC’s will most likely lead to that same 
end result.  Therefore, if the argument is that the use of PMC’s will result in the same 
unintended consequences as state-run armies, the claim ceases to be valid; PMC’s merely 
represent an alternative course of action, as undesirable outcomes remain constant.
B. THE MARKET
Proponents of the use of PMC’s, and specifically their executives, cite self-
regulating market mechanisms as the strongest motivation to ensure the firm’s proper 
behavior.  Indeed, PMC’s are businesses, motivated by profit seeking to attain certain 
goals.  They do not indiscriminately kill for the sake of killing; instead it is a means to 
accomplish the mission for which they have been hired.  Therefore, they argue that they 
are less likely to commit war crimes, kill innocent bystanders, or kill indiscriminately.  
Their good public image is vital to their long-term profit potential.188  Any “loss of 
credibility would hurt the PMC’s ability to garner future contracts”189 and would, 
therefore, be detrimental to their bottom line.  Any company that committed such actions 
and lost credibility would be forced to the fringes of the market.  The legitimate 
companies would ‘police their own’ in an attempt to give the whole market a semblance 
of credibility.   Additionally, PMC’s claim that because they are an outside third party, 
the probability of their committing atrocities based on deeply rooted ethnic hatred, or as 
revenge for past injustices, is greatly diminished.190
The problem arises in that what is best for the company is not necessarily what is 
best for the public.  As stated earlier, a private firm’s ultimate goal is profit; its bottom 
line helps dictate its operational activity.  Therefore, if violating the law or committing 
188 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 217.
189 Cullen, Keeping the Dogs of War on a Tight Leash, p. 38.
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war crimes were in the firm’s best interest, the market fails to be a successful self-
regulating mechanism.  Additionally, if a client191 requests that the company commit a 
human-rights violation, it might be in the firm’s best interest to do so in order to maintain 
the client’s satisfaction.192  Not doing so could actually affect the firm’s long-term profit.  
Even if a well-intended firm found out that one of its employees had committed a crime 
of his own volition, it may not be in the firm’s best interest to seek legal prosecution.  
Public knowledge of the behavior may brand the company as a rogue outfit, thereby 
dissuading future customers from seeking its services.  Unfortunately, it may be in the 
company’s best interest to secretly cover up the situation193, and internally fire the guilty 
individual.  This could have further negative consequences, as the guilty party could find 
employment with another PMC which has no knowledge of his previous misdeeds.194
Another possibility is that a firm may decide its best interest is to be branded as a 
company that will do ‘anything’ for the right price.  All businesses seek to set themselves 
apart from their competition.  It is conceivable that a PMC could seek employment by 
those who want a service that others will not perform, even if it is illegal or unethical.  
Lastly, there is nothing to stop a PMC from working with drug cartels, rebel groups 
seeking to overthrow governments, or even terrorists.  Even though most people find
these groups despicable, a rogue PMC could see the partnership as an opportunity to 
make a lot of money, regardless of the outcome to society.195
Adverse selection is another shortcoming of the market defense.  PMC’s are hired 
to do nasty jobs; even legitimate operations require them to kill in order to accomplish 
their mission.  There is also the ever-present danger of death to all who are members of 
the company.  Therefore, it is a certain breed of person who seeks employment within a 
PMC.  As Soldiers or Marines, we fight for a range of motives, the predominant ones 
being patriotism, love of country, freedom, and adventure.  However, many members of 
191 Client refers to the purchasing governments officials.
192 In Corporate Warriors, Peter Singer gives an example where a private military training company 
(MPRI) intentionally reduced its teaching of military conduct and laws of warfare to its client (Bosnian 
military) because the client was uncomfortable with the subject
193 Of course, the incentive to cover up is not limited to PMC’s.  It applies also to government-run 
militaries.
194 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 217,218, 222.
195 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 219, 224.
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PMC’s are motivated only by money and adventure,196 although individual operations 
may have redeeming qualities.197  Moreover, the hiring qualifications of a PMC are much 
different than that of a Fortune 500 company.  Congeniality, friendliness, and amiable 
customer service are not necessarily the personality traits demanded; ruthlessness and 
effectiveness are.  As one industry proponent puts it, a PMC’s associates are “…not nice 
guys.  You wouldn’t want them to marry your sister.”198  The real danger is that PMC’s 
are a draw for those with a propensity for mercenary activity and those who may have 
been forced out of a national military for adverse reasons.199
The last alleged shortcoming of the self-regulating market defense is that the poor 
are disproportionately affected.  According to this argument, when security is a public 
good, all citizens can equally enjoy the service.  The government is required to ensure the 
safety of all its constituents, even if doing so does not make the most business sense.  
Because the government is not motivated by profit, the argument goes, it makes its 
decisions based on the collective good of society.  However, the argument continues, 
when security becomes a privatized good, the best protection goes to those who are 
willing to pay the most for it.  As stated earlier, PMC’s base their decisions on their 
bottom lines; therefore, it is argued that a small, rich neighborhood would be given 
priority for protection over a poor population center because the affluent members have 
the means to pay the PMC, whereas the poor members do not.  If the poor are 
disproportionately affected, populations become even more polarized and the legitimacy 
of the government that was ultimately responsible to provide their security is weakened.  
Lastly, the poor are again affected as the public military members are drawn out of public 
service into the hire of the better-paying private companies, thus weakening even further 
the public defense charged with protecting all of society.200 The problem with this 
196 This is an assumption made by the author.
197 Executive Outcomes presence in Sierra Leone saved thousands of innocent lives, allowed hundreds 
of thousands to return to their homes, and allowed a presidential election to take place.
198 Peter Fabricus, “Private Security Firms Can End Africa’s War’s Cheaply,” Saturday Star
(Johannesburg), September 23, 2000.  Taken from Corporate Warriors by Peter Singer.
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argument is that it ignores the context: PMC’s are hired by governments and a 
government that ignores the desires of the poor can do so whether it is hiring people 
directly or contracting with PMC’s.
C. HOME GOVERNMENT
The home government has two ways to control the actions of a PMC.  The first is 
by the formal means of legislation.  For instance, within the U.S, the Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA) requires PMC’s to register and receive a license for each sale of 
arms or military services to a prospective buyer.201  If the U.S. Government does not 
approve of the customer or of the sale, it can reject the claim and not issue a license.  This 
sort of oversight is effective only if the company wants to maintain good relations with 
the home government.  In order to supersede the government’s will, a company could set 
up an overseas holding company in the purchasing customer’s state.  This essentially 
eliminates the home government’s involvement.  Even if the PMC wants to avoid the 
semblance of impropriety, sometimes its influence and lobbying are enough to erode the 
government’s objections.  One example of this is Military Professional Resource 
Incorporated’s (MPRI) lobbying effort concerning a contract with Equatorial Guinea.  
Eventually, the uneasiness of a non-American PMC winning the contract overcame the 
anxieties of MPRI supporting a despotic regime.202
The second means of home government oversight is more informal, yet carries the 
possibility of more influence.  It is based on the relationships between the PMC and the 
home government’s military and intelligence services.  Many of the executives of these 
companies are former military members themselves, and have many ties to senior 
members still on active duty.  If they were to sever their ties, they would lose one of their 
best sources of intelligence information.  Therefore, in order to ensure garnered support it 
remains in their best interest to maintain close ties with the home government.  However, 
one does not have to look too far for examples where this informal oversight relationship 
201 Cullen, Keeping the Dogs of War on a Tight Leash, p. 37.
202 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 223.
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fell short.203  What is certain is that without a strong link between the PMC and the 
government, no real degree of oversight can be expected via the informal method.204
D. HOST GOVERNMENT
In order to get around the Geneva Convention language against mercenaries, 
employing governments usually make the PMC’s personnel temporary members of the 
country’s armed forces, special constables, if you will.  This technically makes them 
subject to the Geneva Conventions and “subject to the state’s obligations under 
international law.”205  As such, the host government is responsible for ensuring that all 
PMC personnel abide by human-rights conventions.  Moreover, regardless of their status, 
non-state actors such as mercenaries and terrorists are subject to the domestic legislation 
of the country they are operating in.  In theory, this provides the host government with 
the power to control the actions of those operating within their borders.
In practice, however, most host states possess little power to hold PMC’s 
accountable for human rights violations.  For one, it might be in their best interest to 
overlook the violations in order for the military operation to be completed in the most 
efficient and expedient manner.  Pursuing the issue might cause delay or keep the desired 
end state from ever being reached.  Even if a weak state wanted to pursue legal action, 
“[I]t is debatable, and perhaps doubtful, whether a PMC would even allow its employees 
to be tried in a weak state’s judicial system, if such violations were to occur.”206
E. OTHER CONCERNS
There are many unintended consequences when a country contracts with a PMC.  
First, if the company trains one element of the society, even only in defensive tactics, it 
upsets the balance and gives the trained side an advantage.  This could result in ethnic 
cleansing or lopsided victories after the PMC has left the country.  This was the case in 
203 AirScan and Ronco were two U.S. companies that supplied weapons to the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army rebel group and breaking the UN arms embargo in Rwanda.  Both these actions were 
contrary to U.S. laws against aiding these groups.   Taken from Patrick Cullen’s article Keeping the Dogs of 
War on a Tight Leash.
204 Cullen, Keeping the Dogs of War on a Tight Leash, pp. 37-38.
205 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention , p. 71.
206 Cullen, Keeping the Dogs of War on a Tight Leash, p. 38.
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the Balkans where the Bosnian army was benefited by the help of MPRI.207  A second 
unintended consequence that is commonly argued is that there is no guarantee of what a 
client will do with the training once the PMC has left.  It could choose to follow the 
tactics but disregard the lessons on human rights observances.  The two most common 
examples of this cited, Idi Amin (Uganda) and Manuel Noriega (Panama) were both 
Western-trained soldiers who disregarded many of the values they learned and pursued a 
course of crime.208  The fact that neither of these two men benefited from PMC training 
decreases the validity of this argument.  Lastly, the state-run military may view the 
importation of a PMC as a slap in the face and a signal of its own failure.209  This could 
have long-term consequences210 after the PMC has left the country, and the state-run 
military is once again solely responsible for providing security.  
The last and probably greatest concern regarding the use of PMC’s is their lack of 
accountability.  In the U.S. military, soldiers are subject to the UCMJ.  Moreover, the 
military is subject to the President and Congressional oversight.  Any deviations from the 
rules can carry swift justice with a heavy hammer.  There is no such body of law to 
govern the conduct of PMC personnel.  Although they can be subject to international law 
under the host government’s process, as stated earlier, this is not an effective means of 
accountability.  Additionally, these laws apply only to the individual, and not to the 
companies or industry as a whole.  Therefore, PMC’s are subject only to the laws of the 
market, and the shortcomings of the market have been clearly addressed earlier.  
This lack of accountability is as big an issue as ever.  On May 28th, 2005 several 
U.S. Marines made accusations that personnel from a U.S based company, Zapata 
Engineering, fired indiscriminately on both Iraqi civilians and U.S. Marine observation 
posts.  The workers were detained by the military and questioned, but ultimately let go, 
even though several Marines reported that they witnessed them committing this careless 
207 Even though they only taught them defensive tactics, there is a definite carry over into their 
offensive capabilities.
208 Singer, Corporate Warriors, pp. 220-221.  
209 Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention , p. 68.
210 There are numerous possibilities that could arise in this situation:  One, a delegitimized view of the 
state run force by the populace.  Two, an unwillingness of the home military to do their job once the PMC 
has left country.  Three, an inability of the force to meet recruiting goals because of its perception as 
inferior. Four, possible retribution or cruelty by the force as a means of reestablishing their authority.
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and dangerous behavior.211  Whereas the U.S Military has clear rules of engagement 
(ROE) that are enforceable under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), it is 
not clear that the civilian contractors must follow any such ROE.  Moreover, because the 
civilians were ultimately let go, it becomes apparent that there is still no clarity as to 
whom these contracted battlefield combatants must answer to and what their lines of 
accountability are.
F. CONCLUSION
 Just because you can do something, it doesn’t necessarily mean that you should.  
That is a good lesson that parents teach their children, and it is a good lesson regarding 
the use of PMC’s.  While the use of these companies can be highly effective and 
economically efficient, there are many issues that must be considered as well.  Though 
proponents claim that the market will regulate their behavior, as we have seen, the market 
can also cause them to partake in bad behavior.  Host and home governments also carry 
the power to curtail and monitor PMC activity.  However, the home government must 
have good ties with the company in order for that oversight to work.  Additionally, the 
host government must be in a position from which it can wield power, and unfortunately 
this is usually not the case; this explains the need for the PMC in the first place. 
The use of PMC’s is also rife with the possibility of unintended consequences.  
However, it must be understood that those same consequences can come as a result of 
state-run military intervention in a country.  There is no guarantee, for example, of what 
the Iraqi police force and military will do with their newly acquired knowledge once the 
U.S. military leaves their borders.  They could use it to attack Iran or similarly they could 
attempt to cleanse their country of a minority such as the Kurds or Chaldeans.  
The most serious cause for concern with PMC’s is their lack of accountability, 
however.  There are simply very few mechanisms in place by which you can hold 
members of these PMC’s to any standards.212  Currently there are over 20,000213 private 
211 Nathan Hodge, “Army Chief Notes ‘Problematic’ Potential of Armed Contractors on the 
Battlefield,” Defense Daily, August 26, 2005.
212 There could be a regulatory body that oversees the actions of all those within the PMC industry the 
same way that the FDIC helps regulate the banking industry. 
213 Brookings Institution estimates.
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security contractors in Iraq, most playing by there own rules.  Though some214 have 
called for a standard set of rules for them to follow, there has been no action.  It seems as 
if the United States Government and “the international community simply does not want 
tough legislation on this issue.”215
With all their negative possibilities, PMC’s still have a valid purpose.  “These 
companies respond to demand.”216  They operate in areas that “are often the scenes of the 
worst violence in the world today”217 because others will not; they have stepped up while 
the international community has stood idly by.  Regardless of their motives for profit, 
when they are working towards the public’s best interest, “they hold the capacity for 
better moral outcomes than what would occur otherwise.”218
214 Those calling for reform and clarity range from previously cited authors such as Peter Singer and 
David Shearer to members of Congress and even U.S. military commanders conducting operations in Iraq.
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218 Ibid., p. 228.
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V. USES OF PMC’S
A. INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, the United States’ main enemy was the Soviet Union.  The 
military was set up to fight the Soviets in a large-scale war that luckily never came about.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall on the 9th of November 1989 marked the beginning of the end 
of the Cold War and the commencement of a change in focus for the U.S. military.  
However, this change came about slowly.  Even after the Soviets ceased to be a threat 
and the Russian military’s assets (planes, helicopters, small arms, missiles, tanks, etc.) 
were sold off piece-meal on the black market, as well as in sales to foreign nations, the 
U.S. still prepared for a large land war with another world power.  The only problem was 
that there was no such foe on the world stage.
The subsequent military actions taken by the U.S. over the next decade served as 
a wake-up call for the military to realign.  Units began to rely less on heavy armor and 
instead concentrated on becoming ‘light and fast.’  Additionally, because of a shrinking 
budget, personnel cuts became commonplace.219  The military that deployed to Iraq for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003 was a much smaller and lighter version of the one 
that deployed to Kuwait in 1991 for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.  However, it is still not 
clear that the military has the right focus.  This is evidenced by the fact that the Secretary 
of Defense is continuing to make transformation a top priority.
It took our military a matter of weeks to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his 
regime.  It took only slightly longer to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan.  It is clear 
that when it comes to fighting a significant battle with a known enemy, the United States 
military is the best in the world.  However, more than three years later in Afghanistan and 
over two years later in Iraq, it is becoming clear that the U.S. is not nearly as successful 
when it comes to police action and security.  This is because security is not one of the 
military’s core competencies; large-scale wars are the U.S. military’s core competency.  
219 According to the Department of the Air Force FY 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates, air force 
active duty end strength has fallen 37% from 1989 to 2005.   Over the same period, the Army and the Navy 
have seen similar reductions, with a 33% and 38% drop, respectively.  Additionally, the navy has reduced 
its fleet from a 570 ship fleet in 1990 to a current fleet of 288.
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Gary Hamel and C. K. Prahalad, in their innovative article “The Core Competence of the 
Corporation”, explain a core competency to be something that a company can do better 
than its competitors.220  Modern business theories suggest that most activities that are not 
part of a company’s core competency should be outsourced.  Does this mean that the 
Department of Defense (DOD) should outsource every task the military has that is not a 
core competency?  Over the past decade, many functions have been outsourced in the 
Government’s effort to benefit from the cost effectiveness of the private sector.  
However, these have been primarily in the logistical and support realms.  The army’s 
logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP) contract with Haliburton is the best 
example.221
This author believes the trend can be continued, and that there might be additional 
functions that can be outsourced which will lead to further cost savings.  These proposals 
are somewhat radical, but given the nature of warfare that has developed over the past 
few years and the direction in which the military is heading, it is possible that one or all 
of these proposals could be implemented.  There are at least three areas where the U.S. 
Government could employ private military companies (PMC) as part of its foreign 
policy.  The first is in the realm of security operations in areas such as Iraq.  The second 
is in small-scale conflicts such as Haiti.  The last is in situations where the U.S. does not 
want to use its uniformed personnel because of the political implications it could have 
both domestically and abroad, but where a military intervention is perceived to be a good 
idea; Rwanda is a good example where a PMC could have made a significant impact, 
possibly saving hundreds of thousands of lives.
B. BENEFITS OF THE PMC
One of the age-old criticisms of mercenaries is that they benefit from prolonged 
conflict; once the war is over, they are unemployed.  Therefore, the argument is that it is 
in their best interest to ensure that a war lasts as long as possible, regardless of the 
consequences.  However, one must realize that PMC’s are not the traditional type of 
220 C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, “the Core Competence of the Corporation,” Harvard Business 
Review, May 1, 1990. 
221 Other examples include security companies such as Blackwater who are guarding military 
installations in the Middle East, private guard companies manning the gates at military bases INCONUS, 
the turnover of support functions such as food preparation, and the privatization of our travel and moving 
functions to companies such as SATO.
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mercenary; instead they are businesses.  As with any other business, time is money to a 
PMC.  The quicker a PMC can bring about the end of a war it has been hired to conduct, 
the better it usually is for its profit margins.
A PMC’s business reputation is on the line every time it signs a contract.  If a 
PMC shows itself to be highly skilled, it can help establish a positive reputation.  
Conversely, if it does not prove itself to be efficient and cost-effective, there is a risk of 
damage to its future business reputation.  Therefore, a PMC is best served financially by 
ensuring a quick and successful end to any conflict it is hired to carry out.  Moreover, due 
to limited personnel and other business constraints, it would be difficult for a PMC to 
move on to its next business relationship until it completes its current one; the economic 
cost of prolonging a conflict could therefore be the loss of another contract, which carries 
the prospect of more money.
PMC’s are able to limit costs by employing a minimal level of employees when 
they are not carrying out a contract.  On the other hand, when in the performance of a 
contract, the longer a PMC is involved in a conflict, the more costs it incurs by paying 
salaries to its increased employee base.  Likewise, it is not in the best financial interest of 
a PMC to own every piece of gear it could possibly need to execute a mission.  As a 
result, PMC’s lease or rent items such as helicopters, jets, specialized weaponry, or 
vehicles that they do not own but need to successfully carry out a mission.  The longer a 
PMC prolongs a war, the higher its leasing costs.  The increase in both these costs, 
leasing and personnel, erodes the PMC’s profit margin.  Therefore, the faster a PMC can 
complete its mission, up to some point, the more it can control costs, and the higher its 
profit margin will be. 222
C. POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITIES
Peter Singer, author of the book Corporate Warriors, argues that PMC’s could 
benefit from the increased proliferation of warfighting taking place in order to wage the 
war on terror.  He says:
(t)he United States and its coalition allies may become engaged in regions 
of new strategic relevance, which had previously fallen out of the scope of 
222 Douglas J. Brooks, “The business end of military intelligence: private military companies,” 
Military Professional Bulletin, Jul-Sep 1999, Vol. 25, Iss. 3, p. 43.
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policy, such as U.S. forces’ deployment to Afghanistan, Yemen, and the 
Philippines.  However, this comes at a cost.  Their attention and force 
levels in other areas will drop, creating a gap that PMF’s [Private Military 
Firms] will fill.223
While this is undoubtedly possible, it could just as easily be argued that there are 
“possibilities for these companies to complement international and regional peacekeeping 
efforts.”224
The U.S. military is currently involved in two separate conflicts.  These 
operations have stretched the military thin, as a majority of the assets within the 
Department of Defense is being used.  While the services continue to accomplish their 
missions, there is a question of how long they can continue to maintain their vigorous 
deployment cycle.  With approximately 130,000 servicemen and women deployed at any 
one time to Iraq and another 18,000 in Afghanistan, there is growing political pressure for 
the U.S. to scale back.  Even without this political pressure, these massive deployments 
severely limit the DOD’s options if another use of force is needed somewhere else in the 
world.  One remedy to this shortfall would be the use of PMC’s.
The U.S. has already demonstrated a willingness to use private contractors in 
roles that go well beyond logistical support.  In fact, the U.S. has obligated well over 
$766 million to private security firms thus far in Iraq.225  Hiring PMC’s to actually 
augment the current force is the next logical progression.  Doing so would carry many 
inherent risks, as discussed in the previous chapter, but would also have many benefits.  
First, it would allow the military to decrease the number of personnel that they have 
deployed at any given time and give a much needed reprieve to the operating forces.  It 
would also provide the Department of Defense more options and flexibility in the event 
another action is needed.  Second, the use of PMC’s could prove to be cheaper than the 
use of the military.  However, this is dependent on several things, including how the 
contract is written, and will be discussed in the next chapter.
223 Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: the Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), pp. 232-233.
224 David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), p. 76.
225 GAO Report, Rebuilding Iraq: actions needed to improve use of private security providers, July 
2005, p.3.
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Third, the use of a PMC’s decreases the likelihood of service member casualties 
due to the fact that fewer soldiers would be within the theatre of operations.  This could 
be of great benefit to the military because it is the loss of our uniformed personnel that 
causes the public to lose its resolve.226  Although it does not make sense, the American 
citizenry are more concerned with the death and injury of military members than they are 
with the death of private contractors.227  Many citizens rationalize this by saying that ‘it 
is the contractor’s choice to be there.’  At last check, the U.S. has an all-volunteer 
military, but on such an emotional issue, logic is never the prevailing sentiment.  It most 
likely also has a lot to do with the average age of service members, the majority of whom 
are not far removed from high school and are not old enough to drink.  They are 
America’s sons and daughters.
D. STIPULATIONS
In order for the U.S. to use PMC’s effectively, clear rules of engagement will 
have to be established.  Additionally, many of the ethical questions regarding the actions 
of its members will need to be addressed up front.  This will require the implementation 
of new policy that is strictly enforceable.  It is imperative that there be repercussions for 
those PMC members whose conduct does not meet U.S. expectations.  When employed, a 
company must understand that it “becomes an extension of government policy and, when 
operating in foreign lands, its diplomat on the ground.”228  Their conduct should be as 
such, and if not, there need to be punishments both to individual members and to 
shareholders.  It is also crucial that PMC’s not be allowed to act as independent 
organizations with no oversight.  The contract with these companies should explicitly 
state to whom they answer.  As the customer, the military should have as much authority 
as possible over their actions.  Last, there needs to be a decision made as to how these 
members will be classified if captured by the enemy.  Although it is certain that terrorists 
will not abide by the Geneva Conventions, it is imperative that the Geneva Conventions 
be updated to include the status of private military actors and their treatment when 
captured.
226 It was a loss of the public’s resolve that forced the U.S. out of Vietnam and the fear of which 
caused President Clinton to withdraw troops from Somalia.  
227 Singer, Corporate Warriors, p. 232.
228 Ibid., p. 236.
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E. SPONSORED RESERVE
One solution to the stipulations listed above is the British sponsored reserve 
program.  The sponsored reserve (SR) is an innovative approach of using civilians with 
special reserve status in operational support roles.  During peacetime, workers carry out 
their normal work functions as members of a company that is contracted with the 
government.  During hostilities, however, they are activated and deployed as uniformed 
military members to a contingency, not as contractor employees.229  Therefore, they are 
subject to the same rules and regulations that all uniformed members are.230
Tailoring the SR program to the use of PMC’s makes sense and resolves many of 
the problems arising from the use of private military actors.231  First, because the PMC’s 
members are on active duty, the issue of whether they are combatants or noncombatants 
is resolved; they are combatants.  This overcomes the argument that private military 
actors violate the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). LOAC is comprised of two bodies of 
law: Hague Law and Geneva Law.  LOAC classifies participants in armed conflicts as 
either combatants or noncombatants.  To be a combatant, individuals must satisfy all of 
the following conditions: One, they must be commanded by a person responsible for 
subordinates.  Two, they must have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.  
Three, they must carry arms openly.  Four, they must conduct their operations in 
accordance with LOAC.  Noncombatants are not to be deliberately targeted by the enemy 
and are not to take part in direct hostilities towards the enemy; only combatants are 
allowed to take direct action against the enemy.  If a noncombatant takes part in the 
hostilities, he is in violation of LOAC and loses his entitlement to a prisoner of war POW 
status if captured and is subject to trial and punishment as a war criminal.
Second, it deals with the issue of accountability; with an active duty status, 
PMC’s would fall under the control of the Combatant Commander (COCOM).  
Additionally, its members would be subject to the rules of engagement issued by the 
COCOM.  Last, it addresses one argument that many opponents cite as the main reason 
229 Their job function does not change once they have been activated.  For example, someone who 
was a jet mechanic before deployment would function only as a jet mechanic once activated.
230 Stephen M. Blizzard, “Increasing reliance on contractors on the battlefield; how do we keep from 
crossing the line?” Air Force Journal of Logistics, Spring 2004.
231 The entire PMC would be brought on active duty and would continue to function as a PMC.
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for not using civilians on the battlefield: their right to walk away at any time if they deem 
the environment too dangerous.  Under the SR concept, a PMC’s members would lose 
their right to abandon a mission; doing so would risk their prosecution under the UCMJ.  
There is a tradeoff here that should be noted.  The upside is that because the PMCs would 
be required to stay, they would have to fulfill their mission.  The downside is that by not 
allowing the PMC to walk away, the government would lose valuable feedback 
information that normally exists in a market—there are some cases in which it is a good 
idea to walk away.
F. INTEGRATION
The best strategy for using PMC’s in Iraq would not be to mix them in among the 
military.  This would create too many difficulties and confusions in command and 
control.  Instead, provinces232 of Iraq that have been pacified233 should be turned over to 
PMC’s, freeing military members to concentrate on those areas where an enemy 
stronghold persists.  This increase in military focus of the troubled areas might be enough 
to help rid the sector of insurgents and bring relative peace to areas where it had not 
previously been.  Freeing up military members would also enable the services to decrease 
the number of personnel required in the country at any one given time.  PMC’s could also 
be used to help train the new Iraqi military and police forces.  Just as Military 
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) helped train the Croatians in the Balkans, a 
PMC’s knowledge could be put to great use helping prepare the Iraqis for autonomy.
Although it might be too late to implement these ideas in Iraq, it most likely is 
not.  The U.S. military will likely have a presence in Iraq for years to come.  More than 
ten years later, there is still a handful of U.S. military personnel in the Balkans; and over 
fifty years later, there is still a significant U.S. military presence in South Korea.  Even if 
it is too late to implement in Iraq, however, that does not make the idea irrelevant.  The 
U.S. military played a ‘police’ role in the Balkans for several years.  Now it performs that 
same function within Iraq.  It is highly likely that there will be another situation within 
232 There are 18 provinces in Iraq.   “Military commanders in Baghdad and Washington say four Iraqi 
provinces are home to 85 percent of the daily attacks.”  As quoted by Tom Lasseter in “U.S. snipers hunt 
bombs, fight despair”, Lexington Herald-Leader, Oct 2, 2005.  
233 The term pacified is referring to the fourteen provinces accounting for only 15 percent of the daily 
attacks. 
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the next decade where our military is required to step back from its core competency of 
warfighting and assume a peacekeeping role.  If so, there could once again be a possible 
application for PMC’s.  However, it would be crucial for the Government to set the stage 
now and not wait until the next conflict emerges.  Action needs to be taken immediately 
to amend the Geneva Conventions, and Defense policy-makers would be wise to hash out 
the details of PMC use beforehand.
Another area where the U.S. could use PMC’s is in small-scale conflicts.  As 
mentioned earlier, full-scale, high intensity conflicts are the U.S. military’s core 
competency.  That is not to say, however, that the military is not successful in smaller 
conflicts.  On the contrary, it has been very successful.  Grenada, Panama, and Haiti are 
all good examples of the military’s success in small-scale wars.  However, could the 
same end result have been achieved by another alternative at a lower cost?
It was shown in an earlier chapter that Executive Outcomes’ success in Sierra 
Leone cost significantly less than the U.N.’s operations in that country.  Although the 
U.S. military has little in common with a U.N. force, and the two should not be 
compared, neither force is tailor made for the specific mission it is trying to accomplish.  
The U.S. relies on overwhelming force in its missions.  In order to achieve this numerical 
advantage, the entire military war machine is employed.  Even for a small operation, 
numerous vehicles, aircraft, and even ships are employed to ensure victory.  This 
employment comes at a significant price.  On the other hand, PMC’s deploy and employ 
only the equipment they need.  As a business, they make their decisions based on their 
bottom line.  They employ enough equipment to ensure victory, but do not employ so 
much as to be economically inefficient.  This streamlined approach is one of the main 
factors that makes PMC’s cost effective.  Therefore, PMC’s could be a viable alternative 
the next time the U.S. is faced with a small-scale conflict in a country such as Haiti.  
Instead of the U.S. throwing a large percent of its resources behind a force of 
approximately a thousand warfighters, the U.S. could outsource the contract.
The last situation where the U.S. could use PMC’s is in areas where human rights 
violations are occurring and the rest of the world turns a blind eye.  In many of these 
situations, the U.S. decides it is not in the country’s best political interest to get involved 
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and send its military.  For whatever political reason, it is determined that it is not worth 
the risk.  However, looking on as hundreds of thousands of innocent people die should 
not be an acceptable option.  Prior to the genocide in Rwanda, Executive Outcomes was 
contacted by the U.N for possible use.  Lafras Luitingh, a former chief executive officer 
(CEO) of the company, estimated that a force of 1,500 EO personnel could save up to 
200,000 lives.234  The U.N. decided not to pursue that option, or any option for that 
matter, and disastrous consequences ensued; estimates are that over 800,000 Rwandans 
were massacred.  Not only should the U.S. consider employing PMC’s as a way of 
protecting lives, but also the U.N. should consider using PMC’s as an alternative to its 
ineffectual force.
The prospect of the U.S. sending a hired force to another country will no doubt 
inflame some protestors.  However, these same individuals would likely be just as angry 
if the U.S. instead deployed its uniformed troops to the same conflict.  Despite the overall 
good an intervention of this type could have on mankind, there are those who will never 
accept it as a feasible solution.  However, to those with an open mind, the perceptions of 
the U.S. using a hired force might not be as negative as seeing U.S. soldiers with the 
American flag on their uniform.  It would be much harder to use pictures of PMC 
members to incite hatred and aid in recruitment of terrorists than it would be to use 
pictures of clearly identified U.S. military personnel.
G. CONCLUSION
The DOD has been inching towards the use of PMC’s with the actions it has taken 
over the past decade.  Privatized armed guards man the gates at military bases in the 
United States as well as in Kuwait and Iraq.  Fifty years ago it would have been 
unthinkable to have privately armed security personnel on the battlefield; today their 
presence in Iraq is common.  Private contractors operate various weapon systems on 
numerous U.S Navy ships, and so on.  The privatizing of the U.S. military and 
specifically its warfighting functions is likely to increase over the coming years.
The use of a PMC is not likely to be a popular idea with many, at first.  The 
stigma attached to using individuals perceived as mercenaries will certainly cause some 
234 Information taken from the History Channel documentary “Soldiers for Hire”.
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to reject the idea without due consideration.  Those in the armed forces might view it as a 
threat to job security or as a slap in the face concerning the military’s abilities.  It should 
not be viewed as such.  As the U.S. executes the global war on terror, it is becoming 
evident that the scope of war will continue to be varied and dispersed.  PMC’s should not 
be viewed as a replacement for the military, but as a complement; the use of PMC’s as a 
special reserve force would be one way to augment the current force.  Instead of the 
services pursuing a ‘jack of all trades, master of none’ strategy, they would be better 
served to concentrate on their core competencies and outsource those functions that are 
not.  The three possibilities listed above are not an all-inclusive list, but only a starting 
point.  As the face of war continues to evolve, more opportunities to outsource to those 
specializing in a particular military function will present themselves.
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VI. IRAQI SECURITY CONTRACT ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Outsourcing allows the Government to realize cost savings by allowing a more 
economically efficient private enterprise to accomplish the same mission previously 
carried out by the government.  Once the U.S. Government decides to use PMC’s as part 
of its foreign strategy, the contracts the Government signs with these companies must be 
written in such a way as to ensure the Government can maximize the benefits such an 
agreement allows.  Failing to do so and allowing the outsourced function’s costs to rise to 
levels higher than beforehand contradicts the intended purpose of outsourcing in the first 
place.  As of yet, there are no examples of the Government contracting out a military 
operation to a PMC.  However, there are numerous examples of Government outsourcing 
within a combat theatre; for example, the army’s LOGCAP contract with Halliburton.  
This contract has faced intense scrutiny because there is a perception the Government has 
not provided an adequate level of contract oversight and has allowed costs to rise to an 
unacceptable level.  It is imperative that no such perceptions exist in any contract with a 
PMC; the contract should be written so that it is immediately apparent to the casual 
observer that using the PMC was in the best financial interest of the Government. 
Presently, Government outsourcing in Iraq is at an unprecedented level.  As of 
December 2004, more than $766 million had been obligated for private security 
providers.  Some may question the need for this outsourced function; however, the fact 
remains that providing security for outside agencies and private contractors not directly 
supporting the military’s mission is not part of the U.S. military’s responsibility.  
Therefore, private security companies have filled the void via subcontracts with 
reconstruction contractors or directly with contracts from the Federal Government.235
Unfortunately, it appears that the contracts with these security companies have not been 
written in the most logical and cost-effective manner.  
235 GAO Report, “Rebuilding Iraq: actions needed to improve use of private security providers,” July 
2005, p.3.
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Normally, the Government bases the selected contract vehicle on the level of risk 
associated with the performance of that contract.  For those contracts dealing with mature 
technologies or routine procedures where costs should be relatively known ahead of time, 
a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract vehicle is selected; a FFP puts all of the risk for 
performance on the contractor.  However, if the technology is immature, costs cannot be 
accurately determined ahead of time, or the company would shoulder an inordinate 
amount of risk in accepting the contract, the Government will resort to a Cost Plus (CP) 
contract vehicle as an incentive for companies to take on that risk; a CP contract jointly 
shares the burden between the Government and the company because the company will 
be reimbursed for all costs incurred in the performance of the contract. 
This rest of this chapter examines one Cost-Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract 
valued at over $200 million that the Government awarded to a private security firm for 
operations in Iraq.236  In particular, it focuses on the mechanisms and incentives, or lack 
thereof, built into the contract to ensure that the firm controls costs.  There are many 
shortcomings with the contract structure used in this instance.  First, the use of a cost 
reimbursement contract, by its nature, decreases the company’s motivation to control its 
costs because it will be reimbursed for all allowable, allocable, and legal costs incurred in 
the performance of the contract.  Second, the use of a fixed fee ensures that the 
company237 will make a guaranteed profit, regardless of performance or financial 
prudence.  Last, the required costing data estimates were inadequate for a contract of this 
size.
B. COST REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACT
A cost reimbursement contract is normally used when there is emerging or 
immature technology, there are many unknowns, or the contractor faces disproportionate 
risk in the execution of the contract.  Reimbursement is not contingent on mission 
accomplishment or success; the firm is responsible only for giving its “best effort.”  In 
this type of contract, the Government must reimburse the company for all allowable238, 
236 Due to proprietary information, the company name and contract number will remain anonymous.
237 The terms “company”, “contractor”, “firm”, and “business” will be used interchangeably in this 
paper.
238 Allowable costs are those that are reasonable and allocable, conform to applicable cost principles 
and standards, and are in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.
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allocable239, and reasonable240 costs the company incurred in performing the contract.  
This relaxed definition means that the company will be reimbursed for any cost it can 
attach to the job at hand, regardless of whether the job could have been satisfactorily 
accomplished without the cost having been incurred.  This provides little to no incentive 
for any company to control its costs.  However, it does provide the company an incentive 
to incur costs that further both their business interests and mission accomplishment at the 
same time.
A Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract vehicle, if sufficiently attractive, would be a 
more prudent way to ensure that businesses control their costs.  In a FFP contract, the 
Government pays only the predetermined negotiated price agreed to by both the 
Government and the business.  One could argue that a FFP contract is required in this 
case by claiming that security is a commercial good.  According to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), a commercial item is any good or service that has been 
used, sold, or offered to the public.  Additionally, it is any item that is a modification to, 
or has evolved from, a good or service previously offered to the public.241  If private 
security, even private security provided in a hostile foreign land full of perils, meets the 
above criteria as a commercial item or service, then the Government is required to use a 
FFP contract.242  It is worthwhile to note that a commercial company cannot normally be 
forced to accept any contract and companies will bid based on anticipated risks and 
benefits.  A CPFF contract entices companies to bid in high-risk situations as most of the 
risk is placed on the Government while a FFP contract places most of the risk on the 
contractor.
Some might argue that it is not that simple; a FFP contract decreases a company’s 
flexibility in a contingent environment.  How can it know all possible costs ahead of time 
when the environment changes on a daily basis?  Stan Soloway, President of the 
Professional Services Council, provides a valid argument for that rationale.  He claims 
239 Allocable deals with where a cost can be assigned.  A cost must be chargeable to the contract for 
which it is incurred.
240 There are many tests for reasonableness, but for our purposes they are costs a prudent business 
person would pay in the conduct of competitive business.
241 FAR Part 2.101.
242 FAR Part 12.207.
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that “requirements definition and our ability - or lack thereof- to clarify and define 
requirements in advance”243 is one of the primary reasons not to rely on a FFP contract.  
Too many times, FFP contracts are “being used in environments where they absolutely do 
not belong.”244  Additionally, Mr. Soloway believes that Governmental contracting 
officers are using FFP contracts as a safe strategy because of political pressure and 
increased oversight by multiple concerned parties.
Soloway also argues that “the government’s ability or lack thereof to effectively 
manage a contract is not a good basis on which to select a contract type.”245  Instead, the 
operational realities within which the contract will be executed should dictate the contract 
vehicle.  If contract type is selected strictly by virtue of the Government’s oversight 
ability, then the Government will find itself involved in many bad business arrangements 
that are detrimental to the contractor as well as the Government.  While this author agrees 
with Mr. Soloway, he believes cost-based contracts should be used only when risks are so 
high that competent companies would likely not bid on a FFP contract.  As the 
environment becomes more stable and uncertainties disappear, subsequent follow-on 
years of existing contracts should become FFP, reflecting the reduced risk.  Additionally, 
creative incentives must be built into contracts to ensure that costs are kept to a 
minimum.  
C. FIXED FEE
Another problem with the security contract being examined is not only that it is a 
cost reimbursement contract, but also that there is a fixed fee.246  Regardless of the 
amount of cost incurred, the company still receives the predetermined fee (profit).  Some 
argue that tying a set fee to the estimated costs does provide the firm an incentive to 
minimize costs; the more costs rise, the less significant the fee (profit) is in terms of 
overall costs and the lower their return on shareholder investment (ROI).  Alternatively, 
the more costs are controlled, the higher the percentage of fee relative to the overall costs 
243 Personal email correspondence with Mr. Soloway dated 22 Aug, 2005.
244 Ibid.
245 Personal email correspondence with Mr. Soloway dated 22 Aug, 2005.
246 This fee is a predetermined amount that represents the firm’s profit.
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and the greater the firm’s ROI. 247  This is not a strong incentive, however; the firm will 
still make the same profit regardless of whether it controls costs or not.  Therefore, the 
firm is indifferent to controlling costs unless costs threaten cancellation.
A solution to the fixed-fee problem is to tie the fee to the firm’s ability to control 
its costs.  Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) and Cost-Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contract 
vehicles, where the incentive or award is based on cost control, do just that.  The actual 
fee the firm can attain is relative to its ability to keep costs under its initial cost estimate, 
also called the target cost.  If actual costs equal target cost, the firm wins the target fee.  
However, if actual cost is less than the target cost, the firm benefits by receiving the 
target fee plus a percentage of each dollar under the target cost.248  The higher the 
proportion of each dollar the firm can win by maintaining costs, the more incentive it has 
to maintain those costs.  Conversely, the firm is punished for not maintaining costs.  For 
every dollar of actual cost over target, the firm loses a proportion of the estimated fee.249
Theoretically, the firm could lose its entire fee if cost overruns are significant.  Moreover, 
a penalty could be built into the contract whereby the firm would be penalized if costs 
greatly exceed its target.  In this situation, the firm would not be reimbursed for a 
proportion or all of its costs above a certain threshold.    
D. COSTING DATA
The Government’s most powerful tool in validating a contractor’s cost proposal is 
certified costing data.  “Certified” means it is current, accurate, and complete at the time 
of submission and, more important, at the time of price agreement.  The requirement for 
certified data ensures detailed and accurate estimates by the contractor and provides the 
Government restitution in cases where a contractor submits false or defective data.250
The only exemptions to certified data are for purchases of commercial items, when prices 
are set by law, when adequate competition exists, or when the requirement is unilaterally 
247 For instance: Estimated costs=$200M, Fixed fee=10M.  Therefore the fee is 10/200= 5% of the 
contract, but if costs rise to $250M, then the fixed fee is only 10/250=4% of the overall contract.  
Conversely, if costs are only $150M, then the fixed fee is 10/150= 6.6%.
248 For instance, for every dollar under target cost, the firm may increase its fee by $.80.
249 For instance, for every dollar over target cost, the firm’s fee is decreased by $.60.
250 Government is entitled to the amount of actual overpayment, a penalty equal to the overpayment, 
and any interest on the overpayment that resulted from the defective information.
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waived by the contracting officer.  As stated above, the security contract being analyzed 
most likely meets the requirements of a commercial item and therefore should have been 
offered as a FFP; certified costing data would have been exempted.  However, this was 
not considered a commercial item and was exempted from the necessity only because the 
contracting officer waived the requirement.  
On a multi-million dollar cost reimbursement contract251, requesting other than 
certified cost and pricing data, as was done in this case, sends up red flags.  There are no 
repercussions to the company if its estimates are wrong, and it is difficult for the 
Government to ascertain whether the estimates are accurate and realistic.  Companies can 
submit low estimates in hopes that they are awarded the contract.  Later, even if costs 
exceed the original estimate, they will be fully reimbursed.   Additionally, in this 
contract, the Government relaxed the requirement even more by requesting only cost 
summary roll-ups.252  Instead of providing detailed estimates, the submittals were in 
broad, catch-all categories.  This easement makes it even more difficult for the 
Government to adequately predetermine and subsequently control costs.
E. CONCLUSION
While there is no perfect contract recipe that will fit every situation, certain 
lessons can be learned from this case.  First, a realistic assessment must be made as to 
whether an item fits the FAR’s definition of a commercial item.  If it cannot, and a cost 
reimbursement contract must be used, then the Government needs to provide more 
incentives for companies to contain their costs as best they can.  Structuring the award or 
incentive fee in a way that rewards a company for staying at or under cost and penalizes 
it for cost overruns can be a very effective tool.  Additionally, requiring certified costing 
data, especially on lucrative contracts, is a good way to ensure that a company’s estimates 
are legitimate and accurate; if estimates are not accurate, the Government is able to 
penalize those companies that submitted defective data resulting in overpayment.  These 
recommendations do not represent a complete list of corrective actions but would provide 
251 The minimum threshold for requiring certified costing data is $550,000
252 A roll-up is a summary of the overall estimate that allows for quick analysis.  Instead of providing 
a great deal of detail and the basis from which the estimate was made, it merely gives the total of the final 
estimate. 
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a good first step in controlling costs in the contingent environment.  This is crucial 
because failure to control costs in a contract with a PMC negates the benefits of 
outsourcing to the PMC in the first place.  Many of the Government’s current contracts 
provide us with examples of what not to do; we can learn much by examining the 
Government’s performance with these battlefield contracts.  Taking these lessons learned 
and applying them to future contracts with PMC’s will help ensure that the estimated 
economic benefits of outsourcing are realized.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A. REVISITING THE PAST
At the beginning of this paper, we learned how mercenaries have been around as 
long as conflicts have existed between people.  Soldiers for hire have always been 
available to provide their exceptional skills in warfighting to a customer who desired 
such a skill.  The demand for mercenaries has varied throughout history, as the means of 
fighting wars has continually changed over the centuries.  When an individual’s skill was 
more highly valued by battlefield tacticians, there was no shortage of work for the hired 
soldier.  However, when troop concentration and overwhelming mass were preferred over 
the skills of the individual soldier, mercenaries fell out of vogue.
Soldiering for hire has taken many different forms.  First there were allied 
tribesmen paid to fight alongside the Egyptian Pharaoh’s army.  Later, Hannibal hired an 
army of foreigners who wanted to see the Roman Empire defeated.  In the Byzantine 
Empire, mercenaries took the form of the Varangian Guard, which was paid to protect the 
emperor.  During the Middle Ages, hired vassals, or ‘free lances’, formed free companies, 
which sold themselves to local rulers who sought protection.  The free companies gave 
way to the condottieri who signed legal contracts with their employers, offering their 
services in return for payment.  Next, there were the barbarous landsknecht who sold 
their skill with the pike to the Holy Roman Emperor.  During the Revolutionary War, the 
British hired a whole army of German Hessians to help them wage war on the fledgling 
United States.  In the nineteenth century, the Nepalese Gurkhas and the French Foreign 
Legion gained notoriety for their success in battle.
B. PRESENT-DAY
In the twenty-first century, hired soldiers are most commonly employees of 
Private Military Companies (PMC).  These companies have much in common with their 
mercenary forefathers; they sell their expertise in warfighting to a willing buyer.  
However, PMC’s differ from their predecessors in that they are run as modern-day, for-
profit businesses.  Although it no longer operates, the South African based Executive 
Outcomes (EO) is the best example of a PMC.  EO’s successful operations in Angola and 
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Sierra Leone proved that warfare is no longer a monopoly of the state.  Moreover, EO 
demonstrated not only that a private company could accomplish the same results as a 
government army, but also that it could do so in a more cost-effective manner than the 
government force could.
Although using PMC’s can have positive implications, many issues must be 
contemplated before using them.  As of yet, there has been no determination of what a 
private actor’s status is when captured by the enemy.  Additionally, there are no 
established regulations they must follow, and even if there were, there is no oversight 
body in place to monitor their actions; instead, the only control mechanism for these 
companies is the self-regulating free market.  Devising solutions to the issues above is 
undoubtedly the first step that must be taken before a PMC’s use can be contemplated; 
one solution is the use of a special-reserve program.  Because the members of the PMC 
would be on active duty, they would be entitled to the same POW status as any other 
military member, be subject to the UCMJ, and be held accountable by the theatre 
combatant commander.
Assuming that solutions to the above concerns can be found, the economic 
advantages of using a PMC are only as good as the contract that binds the two parties 
together.  If the contract does not give the company an incentive to control costs, it is 
likely that costs will be higher than otherwise, and the economic efficiency of using a 
PMC will not be fully realized.  However, if contractual incentives are in place to ensure 
that the company is cost-effective, both parties stand to benefit financially from the 
arrangement.  One way to give PMC’s an incentive to control costs is to agree on a firm 
fixed price.  This type of agreement puts the risk on the PMC, but encourages it to control 
costs.
Agreeing on a pre-negotiated price with a PMC has other benefits as well; it 
motivates the PMC to complete the contract quickly.  One of the age-old criticisms of 
mercenaries is that they benefit from prolonged conflict; once the war is over, they are 
unemployed.  Therefore, the argument is that it is in their best interest to ensure the war 
lasts as long as possible, regardless of the consequences.  However, one must realize that 
PMC’s are not the traditional type of mercenary; instead they are businesses.  As with 
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any other business, time is money to a PMC.  Therefore, the PMC is best served 
financially by ensuring a quick and successful end to any war it is hired to carry out.
The United States could possibly benefit from the use of PMC’s.  In the current 
war on terror, the armed services are stretched thin; the use of a PMC would help 
alleviate some of this burden.  Additionally, as the defense budget continues to tighten, 
PMC’s offer an additional outsource capability that could free up money to be used 
elsewhere.  Although the use of PMC’s would be highly controversial at first, that should 
not stop policy makers from pursuing this possibility.
C. FURTHER STUDY
Further study, research, and policy implementation is needed in many areas 
before PMC’s use is actually implemented.  First, an enhanced analysis of the ethical 
implications of such use should be undertaken.  Second, the Geneva Conventions needs 
to be updated to clearly define the status of non-uniformed combatants that are captured 
by the enemy.  The Conventions should also be updated with respect to mercenaries.  
Third, contractual aspects must be examined more closely.  Any contract conducted on a 
battlefield will be very complex.  Further study on how best to write that contract is 
needed.  Additionally, there should be increased training for personnel who will have 
oversight of contracts that are carried out in a contingent environment.  Last, there should 
be a study of how PMC’s might best be incorporated into the U.S. political and military 
policy.  
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